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6 electricity, long-distance transmission had become established, and regional networks had begun to take shape' (Hausman, Hertner, and Wilkins, 2008, p. 30) .
Based on the end date of 1914, the case was developed within two major, distinct time periods, as is explained fully in Section 5.1 below. The first period, 1889 -1898, covers NESCo's formation and its emergence as a local electric lighting company; the second period, 1898 -1914, encompasses the development and adoption of radical new strategies that heralded the emergence of NESCo as a regional electric power company of national significance.
Following the methodology advocated by Langley (1999) for the analysis of process data, the authors built a narrative of the emergence and growth of NESCo. This narrative is based on a detailed study of the firm's vast, albeit incomplete, archive (DU.EB), from inception in 1889 through until 1914, and the relevant literature (e.g. Beard, 1918; Byatt, 1979; Engineering, 1911; Hannah, 1979; The Statist, 1911) . Separately and jointly, the researchers examined minutes of Directors' meetings, costing reports to Directors, minutes of management meetings, Directors' reports to annual general meetings, annual financial reports, and other documentation. These examinations were discussed and differences were resolved after joint re-scrutiny and re-assessment. The specific focus of this work is on the nature of costing information prepared for strategy development and analysis, hereafter termed as strategic costing, and on the people who prepared this information rather than on the strategic decision-making process itself.
The British electricity supply industry
Following Faraday's experiments in electromagnetic induction in 1831, engineers developed small dynamos for the generation of electricity (Byatt, 1979, p. 1) . It was not until the late 1870s that improved dynamo design led to reductions in generating costs and the belief that electricity had arrived as a viable competitor to gas for the provision of lighting. The Electric Lighting Act of 1882, which eased the legal requirements for the formation of electricity supply companies, coincided with a short period of recovery within the great British depression of 1873 -1896 (Hughes, 1962, p.33) and there was a boom in applications for company formation, including eighty three in the first month after the passage of the Act: 'private enterprise had the opportunity of risking capital in an area of the economy on the technological frontier' (Hughes, 1979, p.31) .
The Brush Electric Lighting Company was at the forefront of developments and there was a mania in its shares which came to be known as the 'Brush Bubble' (Hughes, 1962, p. 29) : in May 1882, the company's £10 shares rose to a market price of £68 (Byatt, 1979, p.18) . However, the industry soon began to experience technological problems (Hughes, 1962, p. 33) . Moreover, 'the success of the 7 boom depended crucially on the supposition that electric lighting cost no more than gas lighting . . .
[but] hopes about the extent of economies of scale proved . . to have been greatly exaggerated, and soon all the companies found their installations losing money. Many of them collapsed fairly soon.
The year 1883 was calamitous' (Byatt, 1979, p. 18 ). There were only four successful applications to form electricity supply companies in 1883, none at all in 1884 (Byatt, 1979, 9. 21 ) and in 1884 the Brush Electric Lighting Company 'had to devalue the £10 share by a half' (Hughes, 1979, p. 33) . From 1882 onwards, the British electrical supply industry suffered from 'circumspection and caution' together with 'a confluence of [adverse] legislative, technological, and economic [factors]' (Hughes, 1962, p. 39) .
In 1888, the 1882 Act was amended in order to enable companies to extend their tenure of central power stations from twenty-one to forty-two years in order to make investment in the industry more attractive. However, many local authorities hindered or blocked such investment in order to protect their own municipal gas undertakings (Hannah, 1979, p.8 ) and the electricity supply industry was restricted by this competition from gas (Shiman, 1993, p. 320 -324) . Thus, through until the 1890s, the British electrical supply industry consisted of a multiplicity of organisations operating on a small scale within a small market (Wilson, 1988) and it was 'little more than a collection of huts and basements with clanking reciprocating steam engines supplying lamps within a relatively small radius, providing challenges to the intellect of the engineer and an expensive, luxury illuminant for consumers, but with few spin-offs affecting the life and work of the nation in any significant way' (Hannah, 1979, p. 10 ).
NESCo: an electric lighting company, 1889 -1898
Taking advantage of the 1888 legislation, NESCo was incorporated in January 1889, at the instigation of Robert Spence Watson, a Newcastle solicitor, and his brother-in-law Dr Theodore Merz, a Newcastle chemist and industrialist, in order to supply electric lighting (Beard, 1918) . In February 1889, Monkhouse Goddard, the Newcastle firm of Public Accountants, presented a Report (DU.EB/1/1) to the Directors of NESCo detailing estimates for the new company: initial capital expenditure requirements, £5,000; annual revenue, £2,500; annual operating costs, £1,400; and annual profit, £1,100. Working papers for this Report do not show any bases for these estimates or any calculations underlying them but do set out details of NESCo's proposed prices, as indicated by its Board of Trade Licence application, in relation to consumers' quarterly usage of units of electricity: 5 shillings up to 10 units; 4 shillings and 2 pence between 11 -20 units; 2 shillings and 9.3 pence over 20 units, and it was noted in this case that the equivalent price of gas was 2 shillings and 8.4 pence. The working papers also show that NESCo's estimated cost of electricity was 1 shilling 8 and 6.5 pence per unit whereas the equivalent cost of gas was 1 shilling and 5.75 pence. The Report and its working papers do not provide any strategic commentary, but they do indicate an awareness of the need for external as well as internal data and for comparisons with gas, electricity's major competitor in the lighting market.
A subsequent report (DU.EB/1/1), in April 1889, reveals that NESCo had gathered pricing data from two other electricity supply firms. The prices of a Chelsea firm were seen as irrelevant because of the 'expensive conditions' pertaining there but when it was pointed out that a company in nearby Sunderland 'proposed to charge twice the price of gas, it was proposed by Dr Watson and carried unanimously that the . . . following rates [should be charged by NESCo]:-3/6 (3 shillings and 6 pence), 1 up to 10 units; 3/3 (3 shillings and 3 pence), 10 up to 20 units; 3s [3 shillings]for all over 20 units; with 10% discount for cash payments as in the case of gas . . . Upon this decision, the Canvass for Customers was directed to be proceeded with immediately'. Thus, NESCo's pricing strategy was not determined by its License prices or by detailed cost calculations but, rather, it was decided on the basis of market-based strategic information.
In October 1889, a Report (DU.EB/1/1) to the Directors by F.R. Goddard, of Monkhouse Goddard, noted that NESCo's estimated initial capital expenditure requirements had been revised to £9,115.
Goddard also presented revised estimates of profit for the first 12 months of operations, based on three different scenarios: 'First Scheme, 2,000 lights working 750 hours . . Loss per annum £720. Second Scheme, 2,500 lights working 1,000 hours . . Profit per annum £96. Third Scheme, 4,000 lights working 750 hours . . . Profit per annum £484.' This Report consists simply of the financial numbers and does not contain any narrative detail or commentary, strategic or otherwise. However, also in October 1889, NESCo's engineers, Messrs Heaviside and Jackson, presented the Directors with a comprehensive, eleven pages, 'Engineer's Report on the Financial Position of the Company' (DU.EB/1/1) in which they provided a detailed analysis of the capital expenditure and the work underlying it. Furthermore, the three potential 'Schemes' reported by Goddard were subjected to extensive and detailed re-analysis from financial, engineering and business perspectives and a clear strategic conclusion was stated, . . . the course recommended is to push the business so as to quickly overtake No. (Beard, 1918) . Under this non-competition agreement, and with the consent of Newcastle Corporation, NESCo began the supply of electricity for lighting and continued with this business on a small scale through to 1898 (Tables 1,2 and 3) .
The archive contains no further strategic analyses for this period of very limited activity and development. Beyond the calculation of unit costs (DU.EB/1/1), there is no evidence at all of the use of costing for management control purposes. However, from 1898 NESCo undertook a critical change in strategic direction that led to its transformation from a local street lighting company to a regional power company of national and international importance (Tables 1, 2 and 3) . This fundamental strategic change and its consequences are explored in the following sections.
INSERT TABLES 1, 2 AND 3 HERE 5. NESCo: a regional power company, 1898 -1914
Introduction: strategic change
1898 marked a clear break-point in the history of NESCo. From its base as a very small company that simply provided street lighting in Newcastle, in 1898 NESCo made a strategic change of direction with the intention of becoming a regional player (Beard, 1918, p. 2) in 'the most revolutionary of the new technologies [of the Second Industrial Revolution] . . . those that generated and transmitted electricity for lighting, urban traction and industrial power' (Chandler, 1992, p. 81 NESCo's strategic decision to become a power company was a response to developments in the market-place. In 1898, Newcastle Corporation received Parliamentary approval for the construction of a power station for the purpose of supplying electricity to its own tramway system. This carried with it the potential threat of the Corporation's intrusion into the entire electricity supply market, therefore 'the use of electricity for general power purposes in the whole district became the only practicable important development' (Beard, 1918, p. 4) for electricity supply companies operating in the area. A new enterprise, the Tyneside Electric Power Company, headed by Charles Parsons, applied to Parliament for permission to develop a scheme for the whole district. Simultaneously, the Walker and Wallsend Union Gas Company was keen to diversify into the supply of electricity throughout the district. The Gas Company's involvement in electricity was spearheaded by a director, J. Wigham Richardson, who was a brother-in-law to NESCo's founders, Robert Spence Watson and Theodore Merz. Also at this time, NESco's directors realised that 'they must seriously consider their policy' and understood that it was 'necessary for us either to go in for a much larger scheme or to merge our small undertaking into [a] larger organisation' (Beard, 1918 , pp 2 -3).
NESCo's family 'connection' (Beard, 1918, p. 4 ) with the Gas Company enabled the two firms to join forces in a joint enterprise to fulfil the 'larger scheme'. However, Beard (1918, p.2) states that None of the experts or directors . . . possessed either the knowledge or the ability to lay down the lines upon which a large undertaking, meeting all of the requirements of the whole district, should be constructed. We had, indeed, all of the elements of success in our hands, but we had no personal representative who could grasp the whole situation and devote himself exclusively and continuously to the development of a well-considered scheme . . . Fortunately in Charles [Merz] develop that large scheme of [electric] power-supply which Charles [Merz] had worked out in his mind as the right course and aim for our company' (Beard, 1918, pp. 4-5) : 'for all practical purposes the Company was beginning again' (DU.EB/36/1, p. 14). Charles Merz acted as consulting electrical engineer to NESCo from its change of strategic direction in 1898 until his death in the London Blitz of
1940.
Acting on Merz's advice, between 1898 -1914 NESCo adopted strategies that led to its transformation from a local street lighting company to a regional power company of national and international importance (Byatt, 1979, pp. 114 -115) . The company experienced rapid and exponential growth and the extent of NESCo's achievements must be viewed in the context that it was the only financially successful electricity supply company in Great Britain during this period. In 1898, net profit was £5k with a return on shareholders' equity of 8%; by 1914, these figures were £132k and 13% respectively (Tables 1 and 2 ). The growth in total assets was remarkable, from £259k in 1898 to £7,795k in 1914 (Table 3) .
Charles Merz: the 'British Edison'
The historical literature depicts the importance to accounting and costing of 'actors' (Yamey, 1981) , 'change agents' (Boyns and Edwards, 1996) , and key individuals and networks (McLean, 2013) .
During the Second Industrial Revolution, key players from different bodies of expertise, such as engineering and accounting, played significant roles in costing (Fleming, McKinstry and Wallace, 2000; McKinstry, 1999; McLean, 2013; McLean et al, 2015; McLean and Tyson, 2006) . Charles Merz was the 'British Edison' (Hannah, 1979, p. 33) and he was the key player in the emergence and growth of NESCo as a power company. Moreover, he was the dominant figure in
NESCo's production and use of costing information for strategy development and analysis. Charles Merz was born in 1874 into a wealthy Quaker family and during his career he worked with and extended its strong and influential family, business, financial, social and political networks throughout the North East of England, the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States (Byatt, 1979; Hannah, 1979; Hughes, 1993 (Beard, 1918, p. 2) with NESCo and then with Robey's of Lincoln, after which he joined the British Thompson-Houston Company. However, in 1898, at the age of 24, Merz rejected the opportunity of direct employment by NESCo, as he 'did not wish to be tied up to only one concern or scheme' (Beard, 1918, p. 5) , in order to set up the consulting engineering partnership of Merz and McLellan. Charles Merz was appointed as Consulting Engineer to NESCo (Beard, 1918, p. 7) and 'He was to become the engineering brain behind the whole scheme; a man with just the right combination of vision, optimism, and technical skill' (Byatt, 1979, p. 117) . At this time, most of the strategic decisions undertaken in the emergence and development of the electrical industry required 'a mixture of engineering and economics' but there was a shortage of 'good commercial engineers' in Great Britain (Byatt, 1979, p.184 (Byatt, 1979, pp. 185 -186) .
Merz had the confidence and backing of NESCo's newly expanded and strengthened Board of Directors. He justified the Board's high opinion of him and in 1918 a NESCo Director stated that to 'Charles (Merz) . . . is mainly due the unexpected successful development of the North-East coast supply of electrical energy to all kinds of purposes which at this date is considered as a unique instance and a model of enterprise in the United Kingdom' (Beard, 1918, p. 2 1898 -1905; 1906 -1908; and 1908 -1914 . The nature of the construction, content and presentation of the Reports has obliged the current authors to undertake considerable analysis in order to present NESCo's strategies and strategic costing in a manner that is coherent yet true to the original Reports. The 1903 Report consists of 19 pages of text supported by 11 schedules, some of which are several pages in length, and a series of tables and 'curves' (graphs) plus three maps; all documents are printed except for the curves which are hand-drawn; hand-written narratives and data have been added to the printed maps. In handwritten 'Notes' written for his family, Merz states (Beard, 1918, p. 7) his views on the presentation of information:
It was at the commencement of our connection with [NESCo] that we made [our] first plant capacity report . . . I had inherited from my father, I think, a liking for clearly thought out reports and we 13 illustrated the first one by curves of growth which were not so commonly used in those days as they have been since: in fact they are now a feature of every journal report or publication.
Merz's views were put into effect in the preparation of the supporting schedules for the 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1, p.14):
Attached to this Report are estimates for the next three years. These estimates are given in the form of curves, firstly, because we think it is easier to get a grasp of the situation by looking at curves, and secondly, because in making the estimates their accuracy is much more easily seen . . . . . Tables of the figures corresponding to and taken from the above curves are also attached.
It is apparent that Merz and Watson took pains to communicate complex information in a form that they felt was amenable to understanding by NESCo's Directors.
Markets and power stations
The North East of England provided its power companies with significant locational advantages. Domestic and public lighting consumers were concentrated in densely populated conurbations and the 'industrial importance of the North-East Coast is best shown by the fact that whereas its population is less than 5 per cent of that of the United Kingdom, it yields 20 per cent of the total coal, 35 per cent of the ships, 36 per cent of the coke, 37 per cent of the pig iron and 40 per cent of the ironstone produced in the Kingdom' (Newcastle and Gateshead Chamber of Commerce, 1911, p. 136) . Thus, as a power company, NESCo had ready access to significant markets. However, despite these locational advantages, NESCo faced challenges. At this time, many potential customers used alternative energy sources such as gas and steam and had to be persuaded that electricity, and NESCo, were viable options. Furthermore, 'much of the electricity used [in industry] before 1914 was generated by users' (Byatt, 1979, p. 95) themselves rather than by specialist electricity supply organisations and these were new markets, still accounting for 60 per cent of British electricity generation in 1907, that had to be won (Byatt, 1979, p. 95) . Moreover, NESCo faced competition in supply from municipalities and other electrical supply companies and 'had an antiquated system of supply [which was] difficult to extend and one from which it was impossible to supply motive power' and which experienced 'constant faults and interruptions of supply' and required the 'laying [of a new] distribution system' (DU.EB/36/1, p.13). NESCo tackled these problems between 1898 and 1903 with some financial success (Tables 1, 2 The work of Merz and McLellan as consulting engineers ensured that, compared to other British electrical supply companies, NESCo's power stations were built at low capital cost and they had low operating cost, enabling NESCo to adopt a business strategy based on cost leadership. Given these significant competitive advantages, NESCo developed and captured markets not only in lighting for domestic, public and business purposes, but in power for industry and for transport systems (Byatt, 1979, p. 118 -122; DU.EB/36/1, pp. 4 -6 and 13 -17; Engineering, 1911; The Statist, 1911) . A comparison (Tables 1, 2 and 3) of NESCo's financial results for 1902 and those for 1897, its last year as a local lighting company, indicates the impact and success of the strategies adopted in its emergence as a power company: revenue, £45k (£13k); net profit, £18K (£5K); dividend, 7% (8%); share capital plus debentures, £551k (£76k); total assets, £659k (£90k). (Beard, 1918, p. 6 ) that, Because of the reliability of marine engines and as we thought marine engineers were to be our principal consumers we decided to install marine engines in the power station. We also wanted to get the engines made on the [River] Tyne . . . All this time Mac and I had an eye to the commercial side, viz., the necessity of getting customers, and we had long discussions with the various engineers and shipbuilders. There were some prejudices to be overcome; they all wanted to know how much it would cost them compared with the numberless steam engines they used, though actually as it turned out this was not by any means the most important point for them; the really important point about adopting electricity was that it made available for their operations a much more easily adaptable form of power; so much did this prove to be the case that within a very few years the different firms we connected up to the system were spending two or three times as much on electric power as they had ever spent on steam power -not because electric power was more expensive, but because they applied it to so many uses for which, before, they had not used power at all.
Merz and McLellan were so successful in their dealings with Tyneside shipbuilders that in 1908 Merz (Merz, 1908, p. 629 ) was able to claim that there was not "a single firm of shipbuilders or engineers on the north bank of the Tyne inside (NESCo's) area of supply which does not take 95 per cent of its power from the company, the remaining 5 per cent being produced from small gas engines or from boilers fired with scrap wood".
Charles Parsons, the Newcastle-based engineer, had developed turbines in the 1880s and they had become established amongst shipbuilders as a means of providing electric lighting on board ships (McGovern and McLean, 2013, p 
. 7). Merz and McLellan undertook a series of trials and
investigations and Merz notes that they became convinced that turbines were 'the possible coming prime mover' (Beard, 1918 , p. 7) even though 'there was not a single large Turbine Unit in operation' in the country (DU.EB/36/1, p. 4). Merz commented (Beard, 1918, p. 8 Northumberland (Beard, 1918, p. 8) . It also planned a series of joint ventures with other power suppliers and made further plans to take over the power supply function of several local authorities (DU.EB 36/1, pp. 9-12) and to enter into contracts to supply electricity to the North Eastern Railway (NER) and the Tyneside Tramway Company (DU.EB 36/1/12 -13). Overall demand from NESCo's consumers led to an increase in the firm's output of electricity from 1 million kilowatt hours in 1899 to 17 million kilowatt hours in 1904 (Byatt, 1979, p. 118) . Confident in the growing demand for electricity, NESCo needed to develop additional generating capacity and in 1902 Merz and McLellan began the planning of a new power station which opened in 1904, at Carville, near Newcastle (Beard, 1918 p.86) .
It was estimated that Carville added 'plant capable of working up to some' 11,000 KW to Neptune Bank's capacity of c. 5,000KW (DU.EB/36/1, p. 6). The 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule "O", Table   2 ) notes that in previous years actual demand had been: 1899, 1,050 KW; 1900, 1,300 KW; 1901, 2,825 KW; and 1902, 4,993 KW. The Report (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule "O", Table 2) anticipated that extensions to Carville would be necessary to meet sharply increasing demand after 1902 : 1903 1904, 9,540 KW and 1905, 10 ,670 KW, with maximum demand being between 50 -60 per cent of KW installed (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule "O", Table 2 ).
Whilst the archive does not contain any evidence that financial strategic investment analysis was undertaken in respect of the construction of Neptune Bank or Carville, cost considerations lay at the heart of the engineering planning and design process (DU.EB/10/4). Merz considered that the design of Carville was a considerable improvement on any design ever employed by anyone previously (Beard, 1918, p. 8) . In this design, Merz and McLellan worked on the fundamental principle that 'all other considerations are made subservient to the commercial success of the Undertaking as a whole' and noted that the 'commercial success of [the] undertaking is absolutely dependent upon the cheapness and reliability of supply . . . there is a limit in price below which a Supply Company must keep if it is to get consumers at all' (Merz and McLellan, 1904, pp. 696-697) . In their design, Merz and McLellan ran counter to the current conventional wisdom by focusing on limiting and controlling capital costs rather than running costs. They noted that other engineers employed complex designs for power stations in order to enable ease of repair in the eventuality of any and every type breakdown but they stated their view that this led to inordinate increases in complexity and capital costs. Merz and McLellan adopted a simpler design based on independent units which could be isolated for repair in the event of breakdown; moreover they employed an innovative cladded steel-frame building instead of the conventional brick building. Their design delivered low capital and operating costs, together with ease of repair and expansion of capacity. Carville's capital cost was £16 per KW, compared to £20 -£26 per KW for other contemporary power stations in England and, moreover, its running costs were as low as or lower than any other (Byatt, 1979, p. 120 ).
In addition to the construction and operation of power stations at Neptune Bank and Carville, NESCo's expansion necessitated the building of four sub-stations, the laying of new cables and the stabilisation of current, which required a considerable amount of free wiring and installation for domestic and industrial consumers (DU.EB/36/1, pp. 6 -9). However, the end product of this work was regarded with great satisfaction in the 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1, p. 15):
With regard to the efficiency and economy of the system which has been put down we may remark that while the cost of apparatus is continually being reduced we could not, if the whole system had to be reconstructed . . . suggest, even with the experience gained, any alteration in the apparatus used which would give greater security against breakdown or lessen the cost of operation. The Company now have a system which is capable, with comparatively little extension beyond that of the Generating Station, of dealing with any increase in the consumption of electricity in Newcastle itself for a very long time to come.
Thus justifications for the construction of Neptune Bank or Carville were framed around a strategy of cost leadership rather than on financial strategic investment appraisal but they were based on an underlying assumption that the demand for electricity would continue to increase. However, a warning note was sounded in 1903: NESCo had built its generating capacity in anticipation of increasing demand but the present level of output was 'comparatively small for a power scheme. It is necessary to increase output to three or four times its present value if the system is to be used to its greatest advantage' (DU.EB/36/1, p. 16): economies of scale were required. As indicated in the following sub-sections, NESCo sought to obtain the increase in output necessary to support its power stations by moving to capture and extend markets by means of joint ventures and business links; developing its business in traction and in the Northumberland coalfield; and extending its base of industrial and domestic consumers.
Costing and strategy

6.2.1, Introduction
With the help of Watson, in the 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1) Merz set out the strategy that had begun, and would continue, to shape the emergence of NESCo as a regional electric power company. The fundamental strategy of constructing and operating power stations of innovative and radical design has been discussed in Section 6.1 above. After careful analysis of the 1903 Report and other primary and secondary sources, the researchers conclude that Merz's strategy for NESCo was based on four further main elements: joint ventures; the development of new markets in traction; geographical extension to new markets in the Northumberland coalfield; and the extension of its consumer base in industrial and domestic markets. Next, this research examines the implication of costing in the development and analysis of each of these elements of strategy.
6.2.2, Joint Ventures and business links
In 1902, NESCo made a contract with Walker Urban District Council to take over the Council's electricity supply functions (DU.EB/36/1 pp. 10 -11). Financial analysis of the contract (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule D) indicates that NESCo estimated that it would incur a loss of £733 per annum for the first eight years of this contract after which time the contract was estimated to generate a small annual profit. On the face of it, the acceptance of this contract does not seem to be a particularly astute move. However, it was actually part a wider strategy in which NESCo purchased the electrical shares of the Walker and Wallsend Union Gas Company (Beard, 1918, pp. 4 -5) , its joint venture partner in the construction of the Neptune Bank Power Station. The 1903 Report provided an estimate of the increased profit for 1903 resulting directly from this acquisition (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule C) and noted (p. 10) that, while in financial terms, this particular transaction cannot be considered a very great acquisition so far as 1903 is concerned .
. . [it] has been considered necessary from the Company's point of view more as a question of policy . . . to obtain entire control . . . and thus avoid any risk of the progress of electricity supply being prejudiced due to the Gas Company having both a Gas and Electricity Department.
Merz's networks enabled him to initiate business links in pursuit of NESCo's strategy of expansion to obtain increases in output. He knew W.L. Magden who was a director of the Durham Electric Power Distribution Company and, through this contact (Beard, 1918, p. 8 'consumption is less than 1,000,000 Units', falling to 30d per unit if Durham's annual 'consumption exceeds 1,000,000 Units'. For each of 1903, 1904 and 1905 , Schedule E details NESCo's planned revenue from each of the three parts of the charging scheme and calculates planned total annual revenue. Although it was planned that the agreement for the supply of power would end in the next four to six years, it was envisaged (DU.EB/36/1, p. 12) that, there would continue to be a permanent connection between the two Companies' Systems, which, from an engineering point of view, we consider advantageous. We have succeeded in getting the Durham Company to adopt the same standards with regard to voltage and periodicity as we have adopted on this side of the river.
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We consider it probable that before the agreement expires some further agreement may be come to.
Thus, Merz drew upon family and business networks and engineering and pricing expertise in order to formulate NESCo's strategies and the strategic analyses relating to the Walker and Wallsend
Company and the Durham Company.
6.2.3, New markets: traction companies
In 1902, NESCo promoted a Parliamentary Bill for the development of electric tramways on Tyneside but was opposed by the NER which felt that its business would be damaged (Byatt, 1979, p. 117 ).
However, Merz met with George Gibb, General Manager of NER, and, having convinced him of the benefits of electrification, a contract for tramway electrification was made between the two companies. The 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1, pp. 12 -13) lauded this contract as being beneficial to NESCo and noted that the company was not required to incur any capital expenditure beyond the construction of another 'unit' to extend the capacity of the Carville Power Station. The 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule F) presents the following details of the contract: NER would cover the capital cost of the sub-station and cables required whilst NESCo would pay an annual rental cost of 5 per cent of capital cost; NER would take a minimum of 5 million units of electricity per annum; NESCo's pricing structure was to be: 1.0d per unit for the first 3 million units, 0.75d per unit for the next 3 million units and 0.55d per unit for all consumption over 6 million units; caveats specified allowed price reductions in the event of future actual running costs being lower than planned costs. In obtaining this contract, NESCo offered a very keen pricing structure. Its prices to NER were the 'minimum' (DU.EB/36/1, p. 17) to be offered to any consumer buying electricity in bulk. Whilst actual unit costs for this period are not available in the archive, estimated contract profit statements (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule F) reveal that NESCo estimated that its 'Station and General Expenses' on the NER contract would be 0.3d per unit and that it anticipated making a loss on the NER contract in 1903 but that it planned a return on investment of 7.33% for 1904 and 11.2% for 1905. In 1902, with a view to expanding electricity supply into the Northumberland coalfield, NESCo gained Parliamentary approval for its Northumberland Electric Power Bill (Byatt, 1979, p.117 
Costing, strategy and the growth of NESCo, 1906 -1908
This section deals with the period beginning in 1906, the end of the planning period set out in the previous Report (DU.EB/36/1), and ends in 1908, the end of a new planning period covered by a major comprehensive strategic Report (DU.EB/36/2) that dealt with all areas of company activity.
Introduction
In 1906, NESCo adopted strategies and systems that enabled it to achieve significant growth (Tables   1, 2 (Carter, Clegg and Kornberger, 2008) were moving towards more central roles in the provision of information in NESCo.
7.2.2, Markets and power stations
The final 1906 Report (DU.EB/36/1/2, pp. 11 -14) detailed NESCo's strategy to extend its geographical area of operation and to increase its business with local authorities, collieries and the NER. In relation to some of these customers, this Report also provided detailed estimates of revenues, costs and profits for 1906, 1907 and 1908 (Table 2) .
In order to meet market demand for electricity, NESCo undertook extensions of the Carville Power Station. By 1906, Carville had a peak capacity of 33,000 KW but also had spare plant with a capacity of 8,000 KW and it was planned to increase peak capacity by a further 15,000 KW (DU.EB/36/2, p.
14). The NESCo archive (DU.EB) does not contain any strategic costing justification or analysis regarding extensions at Carville, but, between 1904 and 1910, Carville's output cost only £10 per kilowatt and with 'Carville as the lowest-cost power station in the country, the [NESCo] system grew rapidly' (Byatt, 1979, p. 120 Carville provided the foundation for NESCo's emergence and rapid growth (Tables 1, 2 and 3) as a power company and in the years 1906 -10 it provided, on average, 64 per cent of NESCo's electricity supply capacity (Byatt, 1979, p. 122) .
7.2.3, Costs and prices
Gas companies were in direct competition with NESCo for lighting customers and they also competed in the supply of electricity as a motive power by offering the consumer a free 'gas engine and electric generator of sufficient capacity to supply his requirements, the charge made by the Gas It was considered that the fixed cost of supply would be constant between each category of consumer and that the 'only increased cost will be the cost of generating the additional amount of The 1906 Report acknowledged that this was a 'revised way' of analysing costs and revenue but argued that 'it is essential that costs should be made out in this way' (DU.EB/36/2, p. 23).
Although the authors of the 1906 Report did not make any recommendation regarding pricing strategy, they did itemise (DU.EB/36/2, p.24) alternative cost-based methods of charging consumers for the consideration of the Chairman and Directors:
(1) Fixed charge per annum plus unit charge 
Costing, strategy and the growth of NESCo, 1908 -1914
The NESCo archive (DU.EB) does not contain any strategic Reports or strategic costing analyses for the period 1908 -1914, and the authors have not discovered any references to such Reports or analyses in the archive. It is possible that such documents were produced but that they have not survived the vagaries of time. However, the authors judge that it is probable that they were not produced at all, simply because they were not needed: NESCo's strategies and modus operandi remained unchanged during this period and were simply the continuation of what had gone before.
In terms of planning, NESCo's focus was the same in this period as it had been in the years immediately after its change of strategic direction in 1898, that is on the engineering planning and design of a power station and the development of markets. NESCo was the one exception to the norm that British electricity power companies had power stations that were, essentially, scaled-up versions of lighting stations from the turn of the century (Byatt, 1979, p. 96) . Having established itself with the design, construction and operation of the Neptune Bank and Carville Power Stations, the design and use of safe power stations with low capital and operating costs continued to be the fundamental strategy underlying NESCo's success, as evidenced by a new power station that opened in 1910 in Dunston, near Newcastle. Each NESCo power station 'marked an advance on the previous one technically and from the standpoint of economy' (Beard, 1918, p. 10) ; the Dunston Power Station had 23,000 KW capacity, was built at a cost of £11 per KW, 'well below the national average' (Byatt, 1979, p.122) , and it provided the basis for NESCo's continued growth through to 1914. (Byatt, 1979, p. 114) , the apparent discrepancy 29 between these numbers being accounted for by the bulk electricity supplies that NESCo provided to municipalities and other power companies (Byatt, 1979, p. 122) .
NESCo: costing and management control
From its inception, NESCo had calculated power station unit costs on a routine basis but the 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1, p. 19) noted that, to date, perhaps too much attention had been focused on 'the cost per unit at the Power Station, which for the present has reached the lowest practical point'.
Now, it was necessary to re-focus in order to pay attention to 'standing outside expenses and to the general expenses in the offices' which were a large proportion of total production cost. This issue was to be dealt with by two means: first, increasing output; second, 'proper organisation and the saving of duplicate work'. The 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1, p.19) ended by stating:
In the reduction of routine expenditure we attach considerable importance to the increased assistance and attention which can now be given to and by the Accountants Department and the returns which they get out. It is hoped that, in the future more than in the past, the combined and united efforts of all departments may be directed towards a reduction both of Costs and Routine Capital Expenditure.
In making this statement, the Report authors simply emphasised the need to develop and employ appropriate financial controls in the management of NESCo as a rapidly growing but financially sound company. However, although the 1903 and 1906 Reports (DU.EB/36/1; DU.EB/36/2) set out detailed annual financial plans covering the period 1903 -1908, there is no evidence that NESCo developed a routine budgetary control system on a departmental or organisational basis.
Nevertheless, tight managerial and financial control was exercised directly over capital expenditure projects and over contracts with individual consumers. Moreover, documentation dating from 1898 (DU.EB/1/5) and 1900 (DU.EB/5/1) indicates that NESCo prepared weekly cost sheets, fuel accounts and output sheets that were used for managerial control purposes but, unfortunately, these records have not survived in the archive. McLean et al, 2015) , it is probable that NESCo exercised direct, personal control over staff although there is no direct evidence to confirm this.
The regulatory-political environment and strategic costing
In the early nineteenth century, there was little Government regulation of utilities. However, after 1850, gas and water companies were required to obtain Government franchises in order to operate.
The Tramways Act of 1870 required intending 'tramway operators . . . to apply for a Provisional
Order from the Board of Trade [in order] to operate under the general conditions of the Act' and it 'provided for the compulsory purchase of a tramway by the local authority twenty-one years after the granting of the Provisional Order' (Byatt, 1979, p. 198) . The Electric Lighting Act of 1882 was modelled on the Tramways Act of 1870. Intending suppliers of electricity were required to obtain from the Board of Trade either a Licence, giving rights of supply for seven years, or a Provisional
Order, giving rights of supply for twenty-one years after which time it could pass into the ownership of the local authority by compulsory purchase. However, 'many people felt that this Act had hindered [the emergence] of electricity supply too much' and in 1888, the compulsory purchase 'clause was amended to forty-two years' (Byatt, 1979, p. 199) . This amendment of 1888 stimulated Robert Spence Watson and Theodore Merz to instigate the incorporation of NESCo in January 1889 (Beard 1918 Corporation opposed this application and, in order for the Corporation to drop this opposition, NESCo was obliged to accept a compromise term under Provisional Orders of thirty-one years rather than the usual forty-two years. Hannah (1979) notes that there were tensions between electricity industry regulators and supply organisations but Byatt (1979, p. 197) indicates that although legislation was 'a significant factor' in the emergence of the electricity supply industry, 'it should be put in its proper context -as part of an attempt to regulate natural monopolies in the public interest in an economic atmosphere still dominated by laissez-faire views'. Nevertheless, as Hausman, Herner and Wilkins (2008, p. 23 ) note the very nature of electricity led to political involvement in the emerging electricity supply industry, Because energy cannot easily be stored . . . it becomes possible for a utility to engage in price discrimination, charging different prices to different consumers, a practice that could well lead to higher profits. This situation could pit groups of consumers against one another, and the tensions this produced could be played out in the political arena. As electricity became more ubiquitous and more essential . . . the requirement that utilities have government approval at least for their distribution systems made them dependent on politicians, and made their behaviour an object of political concern.
Thus, the electricity supply industry did have a demanding regulatory-political environment; every (Byatt, 1979, 203) . Rather laconically, Beard (1918, p. 7) notes that NESCo was 'fortunate in having as Chairman of the Committee that considered all the Power Bills . . . Sir James Kitson' as these Bills enabled the company's expansion by providing it with the authority to supply power over large areas. Locally, for example, T.G. Gibson, J.P. was a Newcastle businessman and Alderman who Spence Watson recruited to supply finance to NESco and to become Company Director and Chairman, 1889 -1911, whilst also providing the firm with an influential ally in the political arena (Beard, 1918; NESCo, 1948) .
In 1898, Parliament gave approval for Newcastle Corporation to construct an electricity power station. In response to this entry into the market, NESCo and a competitor company each applied to Parliament for permission to develop a scheme for the whole district. (Byatt, 1979, pp. 185 -186) . Furthermore, as Hughes (1993, pp. 453) 
Discussion and Conclusions
The research literature on the 'old' industries of coal, iron and steel (e.g. Boyce, 1992,; Boyns and Edwards, 1995; Boyns and Edwards, 1997; Edwards et al, 1995; Pitts, 2001 ) and shipbuilding and engineering (e.g. McLean, 2006; McLean et al, 2015) provides evidence of the implication of costing in the production of strategic reports. In contrast, the limited literature on the 'new' industries of the Second Industrial Revolution (McKinstry, 1999; McLean, 2006; McLean 2013; McLean et al, 2015) notes an absence of thoroughgoing strategic reviews, although it does indicate the role of costing in one-off strategic decisions. The current article represents a valuable addition to this limited literature; it presents a detailed case study of NESCo's costing for strategy development and analysis, 1889 -1914, and it provides evidence that, in 1903 and 1906 , NESCo produced Reports that were comprehensive in their considerations of business and technological strategies and that employed costing information in the development, analysis and review of these ongoing strategies.
Thus, the current research indicates the existence of a continuity, rather than a break, in the implication of costing in strategy development and analysis from the First to the Second Industrial
Revolution.
This research finds that a combination of three major factors underlay NESCo's adoption of systematic, formal considerations of strategy and its use of costing for strategy development and analysis. First, the novelty, scale and complexity of the electricity supply industry and the firm were such that strategy was best thought through from first principles in a formal manner and costing was an essential aid to the formulation of strategic plans and analyses. Second, NESCo operated in a regulated environment; its effective, formal submissions to Parliament of its strategy and strategic costing were essential elements in gaining the required approval for expansion and had natural corollaries in its strategic Reports (DU.EB/36/1; DU.EB/36/2). Third, and crucially, Charles Merz had the ability and the drive to develop NESCo's strategy and to formulate and enact an appropriate approach to the provision of costing information for strategy development and analysis; moreover, NESCo's electrical engineers and accountants were able to extend and develop his work. This third finding confirms the importance of key players in accounting and costing as noted in the historical literature (McLean, 2013; McLean et al, 2015; McLean and Tyson, 2006; Yamey, 1981) .
Many studies (e.g. Hopwood, 1987; Napier, 2006; Quinn, 2014) have validated the use of history in the study of contemporary accounting and costing. Carnegie and Napier (2012, p. 329) argue that 'History can inform our appreciation of contemporary accounting thought and practice through its power of unifying past, present and future . . . history provides a framework for evaluating accounting's impacts on individuals, organisations and society not just in the past but also today'. As an accounting historian, Jones (2008 Jones ( , p. 1053 ) provides a cautionary note by indicating that 'when interpreting the past through the lens of the present, it is necessary to beware anachronisms'.
However, the issue of anachronism has long been debated within the wider historical community (e.g. Jardine, 2000; Poe, 1996; Tosh, 2003) and, although the dangers are recognised, an accepting, nuanced approach has developed. Hoskin and Macve (1996, p.337) argue for the adoption of a balanced approach that recognises 'the dangers of anachronism when considering the accounting practices of earlier times, and the importance of allowing modern intent in such accounting only after the most stringent scrutiny of the evidence'. Thus, the researchers have proceeded cautiously and have employed stringent scrutiny in employing history in order to develop an analysis that has both historical and contemporary relevance. Therefore, next, the authors consider the implications of their historical findings for contemporary research in four areas of strategic costing/strategic management accounting (SMA).
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First, the contemporary SMA literature may be viewed in the light of the orientation of NESCo's strategic costing. Nixon and Burns (2012a, p. 229) were very aware of the costing cost-benefit equation and took great care to limit the costs of costing by operating simple systems that produced information that was beneficial and readily understood (McLean, 2013; McLean et al 2015) . NESCo's strategic costing covered important areas of internal and external analysis; conceptually, it was based on an understanding of the nature of fixed and variable costs and it presented information to the reader in a straightforward manner, without the accompaniment of a wide range of terminologies. Moreover, NESCo did not attempt to undertake strategic costing on a continuing, ongoing basis; it produced only two Reports (DU.EB/36/1; DU.EB/36/2) based on strategic costing and these Reports were produced at times when there were distinct needs for strategic information. After 1906, when strategies remained constant, no further Reports were produced. Nixon and Burns (2012a, p.229 to the equations of simplicity-complexity and cost-benefit that were well understood by NESCo and other firms operating in the late nineteenth-early twentieth century.
Third, is a consideration of the 'role of accountants in the adoption and implementation of SMA'
Langfield-Smith (2008, p. 219) . Powell (2014, p. 201 -3) notes that, 'it pays to remember that the empirical world of strategy and organization is more personal than impersonal . . indicates that the contribution of external consultants, as experienced in the 'old' industries of coal, iron and steel industries Brackenborough, McLean and Oldroyd, 2001; Pitts, 2001 ), continued to be relevant in the electrical supply industry of the Second Industrial
Revolution. It may be noted that costing textbook author (Garke and Fells, 1887 ) Emile Garke was an electrical engineer who 'specialised in retrenchment and financial management' (Byatt, 1979, p. 189) and worked in both the Brush Electric Lighting Company (Section 3. above) and the Durham Electric Power Distribution Company (Section 6.2.2, above). It is suggested that future research should examine the contrasting roles of key individuals and others, and of formal and informal discourses in the processes of costing for strategy development and analysis. Nixon and Burns (2012a, p.241) recognise that contemporary SMA 'belongs to the [management] team' but they argue that 'accountants are likely to have a competitive advantage in compiling and using financial numbers . . .and ensuring a consistent application of financial criteria in decisions'.
However, in NESCo, engineers were key figures who played crucial roles in both the development of strategy and in the preparation of underlying strategic costing information. Nevertheless, the 1906 Report (DU.EB/36/2) does provide evidence of an increasingly important strategic role for accountants and accounting-based costing and it must be recognised that the boundaries of accounting are in a constant process of definition and redefinition as a body of expertise is created: (Miller, 1998, pp. 618 -619; italics in original) . As in the case of NESCo, interaction between accounting and other bodies of expertise, such as electrical engineering, can lead to hybridisation where 'new phenomena [are] produced out of two or more elements normally found separately' (Miller, Kurunmäki and O'Leary, 2008, p. 943) . Moreover, it is through 'a specific class of hybrids . . . formed at . . . intersections such as those between financial calculation and technological dreams . . . that a particular modality of intervening to manage uncertainty emerges and is made possible' (Miller et al, 2008, p. 945 ). NESCo's strategic costing represents such an intersection. However, Miller et al, note (2008, p. 942 ) that the' existing literature . . . has largely neglected the hybrid practices, processes and expertises that make possible lateral information flows and coordination across the boundaries of organisations, firms and groups of experts or professionals'. NESCo's strategic costing was the hybrid outcome of the work of consultants and company personnel who applied electrical engineering-based costing and accounting-based costing;
the researchers suggest that the further study of hybrids has much to offer the historical and contemporary strategic costing/SMA literatures.
Fourth, this article presents a view of strategic investment appraisal that augments the contemporary literature (e.g. Carr, Kolehmainen and Mitchell, 2013; Haka, 2007; Miller and O'Leary, 2007; Skaerbaek and Tryggestad, 2010) . Hausman et al (2008, p.19) note that 'With the exception of steam railways during that industry's formative years, no other public utility or manufacturing industry came close to approaching the capital intensity of the electric power industry from its inception in the late nineteenth century up to World War I'. However, NESCo did not apply formal financial investment appraisal techniques to its most significant large scale, long term, strategic projects, that is to the building of new power stations. Instead, NESCo investment strategy was based on detailed market research allied to an exponential growth in demand for electricity together with innovative power station design, leading to cost leadership in the market place; formal financial investment appraisal techniques were used only for more limited, smaller scale, shorter term, capital projects. Thus, NESCo's use of strategic investment appraisal techniques was more limited than that presented in the contemporary literature but, nevertheless, its strategic investment strategies were very effective in the context of its time and circumstances.
In conclusion, the authors find that, essentially, NESCo's costing was a 'strategic and commercial technology' (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007, p. 3) employed to underpin strategy development and 37 analysis. The current study confirms the validity of undertaking further archive studies in order to extend our historical knowledge of costing in emerging industries and to employ these historical findings in the analysis of contemporary costing issues. Of particular interest to the current authors is the work of Kraus and Lind (2007, p. 295) the NER, the current authors feel that the NESCo archive offers rich opportunities for further research in order to extend our historical and contemporary knowledge of control and control systems in inter-organisational relationships in emerging industries.
